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Justice Charles M. Leibson and
the Revival of State Constitutional Law:
A Microcosm of a Movement
BY JENNIFER DIGIOVANNI
INTRODUCTION
he resurgence of state constitutional law jurisprudence has
caused many to positively reevaluate the feasibility of state
courts developing an independent body of law based upon their
own state constitutions. Tins Essay will provide an overview of the state
constitutional law revival movement by focusing upon the work of one
state jurist, the late Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Charles M. Leibson.
During his tenure on the court, from 1983 through 1995, Justice Leibson's
state constitutional law opinions underwent a transformation that presaged
similar developments m the greater movement going on nationwide. In
essence, a study of Justice Leibson's work provides a microcosm for
viewing the development of the state constitutional law movement as a
whole.
The transformation of Justice Leibson's opinions demonstrates that,
given time to evolve and grow, state constitutional adjudication can
succeed in creating an alternative body of constitutional law that may be
more protective ofindividual rights and more reflective of the beliefs of the
people than federal constitutional law More particularly, by tapping into
Kentucky's unique culture, traditions, and value system, Justice Leibson's
* Assistant District Attorney, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Former
Appellate Court clerk to the Honorable Peter Paul Olszewski and the Honorable
Joseph A. Huclock, both of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. J.D. 1996,
Duquesne University School of Law. I would like to acknowledge the invaluable
contributions, encouragement, and insight of my former constitutional law
professor and current friend, Ken Gormley, whose dedication to, and enthusiasm
for, this project have been truly remarkable. His unflagging support and dedication
to this Article have been unparalleled and are very much appreciated.
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state constitutional law opinions grew to represent a fully developed and
workable state jurisprudence that was the product of thorough analyses of
Kentucky's rich political and social history
Part I of this Essay will briefly review the history of the relations
between the United States Supreme Court and the various state supreme
courts in the straggle to determine which entity would be primarily
responsible for protecting people's rights and liberties. Part II will provide
a concise survey of the history of the state constitutional law revival
movement and will furnish the reader with both positive and negative
critiques from some of the movement's most vocal commentators. Part Im
will then begin a discussion of Kentucky constitutional law jurisprudence
starting with the first phase of Justice Leibson's state constitutional law
development, in which independent state constitutional analyses were
confined to issues of peculiarly state concern. Part IV of the Essay will
focus upon the middle portion of Justice Leibson's state constitutional law
career, in which he analyzed issues under the Kentucky Constitution where
the United States Supreme Court had not decided a case directly on point.
Part V will concentrate on the culmination of Justice Leibson'sjoumey into
state constitutional law jurisprudence, during which he analyzed rights
issues on the independent basis of the Kentucky Constitution, notwithstand-
mg federal constitutional law precedent to the contrary Finally, the Essay
will conclude with a brief summary of the importance of Justice Leibson's
contributions to the people of Kentucky, m particular, and to the New
Judicial Federalism Movement as a whole.
I. HISTORY OF TENSION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
GOVERNMENTS IN THE STRUGGLE TO DETERMINE WHICH POWER
WOULD BE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING AND
PROTECTING THE PEOPLE'S CIVIL RIGHTS
This section of the Essay will review the history of the tension between
the federal and state governments in their struggle for constitutional
supremacy as guardians of civil rights and liberties. It will demonstrate
that, although our founding fathers envisioned strong state governments
that would protect the rights of their respective citizens, the states abdicated
their responsibilities. In the states' wake, the federal government inter-
vened in order to ensure that all persons enjoyed a certain minimum level
of protection from encroachment upon their guaranteed rights.
None would doubt that the governmental system established by our
founding fathers envisioned a two-tiered system with a strong national
government, but it was also anticipated that the individual states would be
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the primary guardians of the civil liberties of the people. The states'
constitutions, many of which pre-dated the federal Constitution, were the
primary, and in many cases, the sole repositories of individual rights.'
The intricacies of this system, and the compromises that were integral
to its formation, are evident in the debates between the federalists and the
antifederalists of the day. In fact, one of James Madison's goals in writing
the Federalist papers was to alleviate the fears of some factions of the
public that the proposed national government would be too strong and
would subvert the traditional role of the states. Thus, Madison emphasized
that the powers delegated to the national government would be few and
that, apart from these carefully delineated provisions, the states would
continue to be vital and robust guarantors of the rights of the people:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defimed. Those which are to remain in the state
governments are numerous and infinite. The former will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part,
be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and propensities of the people and the internal order, improve-
ment, and propensity of the State.2
The independence with which the states were vested is evident in the
fact that it was not until 1816, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,3 that the
United States Supreme Court held that state court constitutional decisions
were subject to judicial review. In so holding, the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 4 which had
authorized Supreme Court review in such situations.5
It may be the opinion of the appellate court of Virginia in that same
case, however, that best demonstrates the ferocity with which the individ-
ISee generally Stanley J. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1081 (1985).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
3 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
4 1 Stat. 85 (1789).
5 See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 34041 (noting that the state courts are
bound by the Supremacy Clause when adjudicating federal constitutional matters).
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 extended the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to all matters involving federal statutory or common law and
treaties ruled upon by the highest court of any state.
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ual states attempted to guard and protect their perceived supremacy The
judges of the Virginia Court of Appeals boldly asserted that they were not
subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court and
were, therefore, not bound by a previous holding issued by that Court that
reversed the Virginia court and directed that judgment be entered m favor
of the appellant. At oral argument before the United States Supreme Court,
the state's attorney asserted this same position: "This court, undoubtedly,
has all the incidental powers necessary to carry into effect the powers
expressly given by the constitution. But this cannot extend to the exercise
of any power mconsistent with the whole genius, spirit, and tenor of the
constitution."6
Despite the strong assertion ofnational power evident in Justice Story's
opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the state courts retained their
sovereign position as prniary guarantors of the people's civil liberties.
After all, the federal Constitution, with its narrowly defined scope, did not
address the rights of state citizens, but only federal citizens.7 So it worked,
unquestioned in practice if not in theory, until the Reconstruction Era
following the Civil War. This tume period, often referred to as the "vast
transformation,"' saw a tremendous metamorphosis in both the conception
and role of the federal Constitution as a vehicle for protecting people from
state actions that denied them liberties.' Indeed, the effect of the passage
of the Civil War amendments was not lost on those in Congress who
lobbied for their passage. Cognizant of the sweeping changes in our federal
system that the amendments would likely bring about, the drafters and
supporters of the amendments forged ahead nonetheless because of the
6Id. at 316.
' Cf. e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,249 (1833) (holding
that while the federal Constitution did not protect state citizens from local
governmental takings of private property, a state constitution could do so by
requiring additional "safe-guards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments
of their particular governments").
8 For example, in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court characterized 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its predecessor, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, as "product[s] of a vast transformation from the concepts of
federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century [Their] purpose was
to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people to protect the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law "
9 See Mosk, supra note 1, at 1083-84; William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv L. REv 489
(1977).
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belief that the states had, in many cases, abdicated their responsibilities and
duties.'0
This belief was not without foundation. A historical survey of the
states' records of preserving individual liberties shows that any reliance
one placed in the states to protect one's civil rights would have been
questionable at best, and misplaced at worst." It was this empirical data
that led the drive to establish the federal Constitution as the primary font
for the protection of individual liberties.
The transition that culminated in the predominance of the federal
Constitution over the states' constitutions was not smooth or without
casualties. Within five years after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the members of the United States Supreme Court, now more
conservative than their congressional contemporaries, held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to make the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.'2 This was so in spite of the voluminous history surrounding the
passage of the Civil War amendments that clearly and conspicuously
detailed the fact that the amendments were intended to bring about a radical
shift in the balance of power between the federal and state governments.
Stating that "the distinction between citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established,"'3 the Court
held in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause "speaks only of privileges and immunities of the United States, and
does not speak of those citizens of the several states."' 4
Notwithstanding the defeat suffered in the Slaughter-House Cases, the
states were gradually brought within the purview and scope of the federal
Constitution by selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 It was in this way that the
'O See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L.REv 165, 174-76 (1984) [hereinafter Linde, EPluribus]; David
Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv 274
(1992).
" See Lmnde, EPluribus, supra note 10, at 174; Schuman, supra note 10, at 276
n.17 and accompanying text.
2 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,74 (1873) (distinguishing
federal or national citizenship from the privileges and immunities that may accrue
to state citizens).
131d. at 73.
141d. at 74.
" See, e.g., Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (incorporating the Eighth
Amendment Prohibition on excessive bail); Benton v Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
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drafters and supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment saw fruition, albeit
tardily, of their idea that the federal Constitution should set the standards
for state courts to follow
II. HISTORY OF THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM MOVEMENT
After the federal government established itself as the primary guarantor
of the people's civil liberties by not only passing the Civil War
amendments, but also mandating that the states comply with those
amendments, the pendulum of the federal bench's jurisprudential outlook
began to swing to the right. The New Judicial Federalism movement began
to emerge during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Throughout the era of
the Warren Court, when the United States Supreme Court was more liberal
then its state counterparts, the states were constitutionally bound to follow
the precedent of the Supreme Court and extend to their citizens the greater
rights and liberties that the Supreme Court claimed were contained in the
federal Constitution. The mandate of the Supremacy Clause in the federal
Constitution served to force the hand of those state courts that were
reluctant to recognize or protect individual liberties.' In essence, courts
were bound to hold that their state constitutions were at the very least
coextensive with the federal Constitution. The fact that many state courts
were conservative often precluded a finding that a state constitutional
provision was more expansive than a similar or identical federal provision.
The ideological shift on the United States Supreme Court brought
about by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts marks the time period during
which state courts gradually found themselves with a body of state law that
potentially granted the people greater rights than did federal law. As review
was granted by state supreme courts, the question arose whether they
(1969) (Fifth Amendment Prohibition on double jeopardy); Washington v Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1969) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial); Klopferv. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendmentright
to a speedy and public trial); Pointer v Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation of opposing witnesses); Malloy v Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Robinson
v California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment Prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment); Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures); Fiske v Kansas, 274 U.S.
380 (1927) (First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, press, and religion).
16 SeeU.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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should follow the more recent United States Supreme Court decisions which
placed limitations upon so many of the earlier Warren Court holdings, or
continue to interpret their state constitutions m step with the earlier holdings.
As Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote in 1977"
I suppose it was only natural that when during the 1960's our rights and
liberties were m the process of becoming increasingly federalized, state
courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if any, were secured by
state constitutions. It is not easy to pinpoint why state courts are now
beginning to emphasize the protections of their own states' bills of rights. It
may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that these state courts
discern, and disagree with, a trend m recent opinions of the United States
Supreme Court to pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being
[protecting the private rights of individuals] with respect to the application
of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process and the
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment' 7
As with the earlier sweeping changes that culminated in the primacy of
the federal Constitution, the shift to independent analysis of, and holdings
based upon, state constitutions was marked by a good deal of confusion and
debate. As courts began to muddle through early cases grounded m state
constitutional law, which were insulated from review by the United States
Supreme Court, 8 the propriety of the practice was questioned.19
7 Brennan, supra note 9, at 495. Justice Brennan bemoaned what he perceived
to be the weakening of the high Court's application of the "Boyd pnnciple" to
protect individual rights. See id. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the
Court had articulated a content-based privilege against disclosure of personal
papers in a criminal trial based upon the premise that private property rights took
precedence over government interests m obtaining evidence. See Brennan, supra
note 9, at 634-35. Justice Brennan believed that through the "Boyd principle," the
Warren Court had strengthened individual rights protections; he decried the high
Court's increasing rejection of Boyd. See Brennan, supra note 9, at 634-35.
18 See Murdock v City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875)
(holding that a state court decision would be upheld even if the federal question
was incorrectly decided, so long as there was truly an adequate and independent
state ground upon which the decision rested). The high Court revised its holding
in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), stating that while state courts should
be left "free and unfettered" to interpret state constitutions, id. at 1041, the.United
States Supreme Court always has jurisdiction to determine whether asserted non-
federal grounds are "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state]
grounds," id. at 1044.
"9 Michigan v Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983) (noting that even if there is
an independent and adequate state ground that precludes Supreme Court review,
1997-981 1015
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One early critic of the practice of insulating a state court decision by
basing it upon an "adequate and independent state ground" was Dean Scott
Bice.2" Bice's criticism was directed not at the practice of using a state
constitution as an analytical tool to effectuate a decision, but at the
resulting mability of the United States Supreme Court to review the
decision even when it was apparent that a federal question had been
incorrectly decided. In Bice's view, this was an illegitimate practice that
took advantage of the limited jurisdictional reach of the federal courts.2'
Bice believed the solution lay in altering the United States Supreme
Court's policy regarding review of state court decisions involving a
purported "adequate and independent state ground." He argued that the
Supreme Court always should determine whether the federal question had
been correctly decided by the state court, regardless of whether there
existed an adequate state constitutional basis for the decision. If correctly
decided, the state court's judgment would be affirmed. If incorrectly
decided, it would be vacated and remanded. 2
The New Judicial Federalism movement had early proponents as well
as critics. One proponent was Hans A. Linde, then a justice on the Oregon
Supreme Court. As a jurist, Linde wrote scholarly articles about, and
judicial opinions using, the emerging tenets of the state constitutionalism
revival movement. In his seminal article on the topic, Without "Due
Process" UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon,' Linde strongly advocated that
state courts routinely and thoroughly examine their state constitutional
provisions before undertaking an analysis under the federal Constitution,
if they did so at all.24
It was Linde's position that "[t]o begin with the federal claim, as is
customarily done, implicitly admits that the guarantees of the state's
constitution are ineffective to protect the asserted right and that only the
intervention of the federal constitution stands between the claimant and the
state."'25 Acknowledging that proper application of this primacy approach
"[t]his ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and
independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrnal consistency that is required
when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved").
20 See Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv 750, 750-51 (1972).
2i See id. at 755-58.
' See id. at 760-63.
' Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process" UnconstitutionalLawin Oregon, 49
OR. L. REv 125 (1970) [hereinafter Linde, Without "Due Process'].
24 See id. at 133-35.
251d. at 182.
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to state constitutional adjudication necessitated a greater amount of
research and briefing of the issues raised, Lmde wrote that both counsel
and the court wouldbe required"to give independent professional attention
to the text, history, and function of the state constitutional provisions, as is
sometimes found in cases from a generation when constitutions like
Oregon's were still recent and there were fewer federal premises available
to litigants.
26
The debate over the propriety and success of the New Judicial
Federalism movement has not ebbed with time. Instead, a lively and
voluminous exchange continues to be part of the growing jurisprudence of
state constitutional law Perhaps the most well known recent critic of the
movement is Professor James A. Gardner, who concludes, in his article The
FailedDiscourse ofState Constitutionalism, that "state constitutional law
today is a vast wasteland of confusing, and essentially unintelligible
pronouncements." '2 Essentially, Gardner argues that state court decisions
that deviate from the holdings of the United States Supreme Court are
reactionary and result-oriented instead of being the product of a true and
thoughtful jurisprudence that is on the same level as federal
jurisprudence.29
While not denying that state constitutionalism theoretically could
succeed, Gardner claims that both courts and litigants have little interest in
creating a coherent and separate body of state constitutional law, with its
own legal terms, tests, and rationales. 0 Ultimately, Gardner concludes that
state court decisions "show no sign of any discourse of distinctness that
would allow participants in the legal system to craft intelligible arguments
about the nature of any differences between the state and federal
constitutions."'"
Additionally, Gardner posits that state constitutionalism is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the perception of most Americans that they are
national citizens.32 That is, differences among the states based on their own
unique histories and experiences are more perceived than real in this
modem age. Gardner goes so far as to speculate that a robust state
26 1d.
27 James A. Gardner, TheFailedDiscourse ofState Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV 761 (1992).
28 Id. at 763.
29 See Id. at 765.
30 See id. at 781-84.
31 Id. at 804.
32See generally id. at 822-26.
1997-98] 1017
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
constitutionalism could have dangerous side effects, resulting m the sort of
factionalism that led to the great schism that caused the Civil War 3
"[O]nly one constitution at a time can ever truly and safely reflect the
essential character and fundamental values of a people," he wrote.34
Professor Gardner's criticism of state constitutionalism did not go
unanswered. One of the many scholars who responded to Gardner's thesis
was Professor David Schuman,35 who argues that "state constitutional law
does not have to be infrequent, grudging, obscurely reasoned, unoriginal,
or silent with respect to local history and culture." 36 While acknowledging
that Professor Gardner was correct in asserting that few state courts have
risen to the challenge of crafting a unique state constitutional discourse,
Schuman takes issue with Gardner's idea that itwouldbe impracticable and
unwise to do so.
37
Using the state of Oregon as a model, Schuman details how dedication
to state constitutionalism can result in "a strikingly independent universe
of constitutional references and a constitutional culture completely distinct
from the one used by the U.S. Supreme Court.' 38 Beyond this, Schuman
vigorously defends the belief that such a discourse would, in fact, be
positive and would result in havens tailored for those national citizens who
live in a "nation of overlapping and layered loyalties encompassing a
multitude of communities.
'39
While scholars have been watching, analyzing, and critiquing the New
Judicial Federalism movement for the past twenty-five years, there has
been a select group of jurists who have provided them with ample fodder.
State court justices such as Hans A. Lmde of Oregon, Shirley A.
Abrahamson of Wisconsin, Stanley Mosk of California, Judith S. Kaye of
New York, and the late Charles M. Leibson of Kentucky have demon-
strated that, at its best, state constitutional adjudication can provide a rich
discourse and an individualizedjunsprudence tailored for the citizens of a
particular state.
40
33 See id. at 826-27
34 Id. at 827-28.
35See Schuman, supra note 10, at 274.
36Id. at 276.
37 See id. at 276-77
381 Id. at 276.
39 Id. at 278.
40 See generally, e.g., Shirley A. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Con-
stitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV 1141
(1985); Vincent Martin Bonventre, New York's ChiefJudge Kaye: Her Separate
Opinions Bode Wellfor Renewed State Constitutionalism at the Court ofAppeals,
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This evolution has been incremental, as should be expectedwhen anew
type of constitutional adjudication is being molded and developed. As
Justice Abrahamson noted several years ago, "[t]he state courts are
acknowledging the need for a principled theory and approach to state
constitutional law "' Equally important is the fact that the evolution has
been successful when state courts have allowed sufficient time for the
changes to come about. These success stones prove that state constitutional
law is truly a different type of adjudication, and not a reactionary, false
type of adjudication.
m11. OVERVIEW OF PHASE I OF JUSTICE LEIBSON'S
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: INDEPENDENT
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES UNIQUE TO STATE CONCERN
The metamorphosis that state constitutional adjudication has undergone
is best appreciated when viewed on a smaller scale, using one justice's
work as a case study It has often been said that when relying upon state
constitutions, the individual state courts are acting as laboratories,
experimenting and attempting to create a workable and satisfying body of
law for their constituency 42
In choosing a laboratory to enter, one cannot err in surveying the work
of the late Justice Charles M. Leibson of the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
who died of lymphoma in late 1995 at the age of sixty-six. This portion of
the Essay will review and critique several state constitutional law opinions
decided by Justice Leibson during hIs early years on the court. As will be
demonstrated, Justice Leibson's initial forays into state constitutional
jurisprudence were tentative and, at times, terse. Also, the justice's early
experiments with interpreting the Kentucky Constitution were confined to
those cases in which a federal constitutional issue was not raised. It will
become apparent, however, that from these seedling holdings there
emerged a greater talent for, and appreciation of, the abilities of the state
64 TEMPLE L. REV 1163 (1994); Linda Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of
Justices Durham, Kaye andAbrahamson in Shaping the Methodology ofthe "New
Judicial Federalism, "2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 239 (1989).
41 Abrahamson, supra note 40, at 1179.
42 This metaphor was first utilized by Justice Louis Brandeis in his dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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Constitution to provide the people of Kentucky with an individually
tailored, fruitful, and workable body of jurisprudence.
Justice Leibson served the people of Kentucky on their supreme court
from 1983 to 1995. He was widely admired by his colleagues in the legal
community as a brilliant jurist and an insightful thinker.43 Indeed, Justice
Leibson's quest for learning was never quenched in the years after his
admission to the bar and the beginning of is long and distinguished career.
For example, in 1986, Justice Leibson received is LL.M. degree from the
Umversity of Virgia. 4 This lifelong affection for knowledge and his clear
ability to provide quick and accurate msight into all types of legal matters
led to Leibson being hailed as "one of the brightest people ever to serve on
the Kentucky Supreme Court, someone who could slice through
complex legal arguments as skillfully as a pilot navigates dense skies."45
From a state constitutional law standpoint, it is significant that Justice
Leibson began his tenure on the Kentucky Supreme Court in 1983, because
it was at that point in time that the New Judicial Federalism movement was
gaining momentum across a broad range of states. While state constitu-
tional law had long had a core of strong proponents, it was not until the
early 1980s that the movement began, incrementally, to catch the attention
of a number of state court justices, in addition to those academics and
justices who had been debating its utility and propriety for years.
4 6
43 See, e.g., MARQUIS WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAW 531 (Maureen Sprong
ed., 1994). Justice Leibson's accolades included: Kentucky's Outstanding Judge,
Kentucky Bar Association (1990); Outstanding State Trial Judge Award,
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (1980); Outstanding Service Award,
Kentucky Personnel Board (1982); Distinguished Alumni Award, University of
Louisville School of Law (1984); Outstanding Legal Scholarship Award, Brandeis
Society (1984); Outstanding State Appellate Judge Award, Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (1985).
" See id.
45 The New Justice, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 8, 1995, at
12A, see also Leibson's Law, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 13,
1995, at 20A.
46 An illustration of the tremendous growth in state constitutional adjudication
at that time is provided by Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State
Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1986):
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Additionally, the fact that Justice Leibson served on Kentucky's
highest court demonstrates that even small, traditionally conservative states
began to get swept up in the state constitutional law resurgence. Proponents
like Justice Mosk from California and Justice Kaye from New York may
have been regarded as typically radical or liberal in their affection for state
constitutional law. Kentucky, however, was not one of those states in which
one would expect a "radical" or "liberal" movement to take root.47
TABLE I
Number oflndependent State Constitutional Rights Decisions Since 1950
Years Number Percent of Total
1950-1959 3 1
1960-1969 7 2
1970-1974 36 12
1975-1979 88 28
1980-1984 125 40
1985-1986 52 17
Total 311 100
Collins et al. note that the 311 decisions analyzed were those from 1950-1985 in
which state high courts either announced greater rights protection for individuals
under the state's constitution than the federal Constitution, or affirmed individual
rights solely on state constitutional grounds. See id. at 600 nn.2, 5.
"' See id. at 605. There are noticeable regional differences in the degree to
which state constitutional law litigation in individual rights cases has increased
since 1980. The data displayed in Table 3 show a U-shape, regional distribution.
Respondents from both theNortheast and the West reported greater increases in the
number of individual rights cases litigated under their state constitutions since 1980
than did respondents from the Midwest and South.
TABLE 3
Perceptions of State Constitutional Rights Litigation by Region
Percent ofRespondents
Response Northeast Midwest South West
Significant increase 73 0 5 24
Moderate increase 20 27 29 29
Slight increase 7 45 24 29
No increase 0 27 43 18
Total number 15 11 21 17
Percent of 311 actual
cases decided since
1950 [261 r7] [16] [51]
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Before discussing Justice Leibson's opinions, however, it may be
helpful to delineate the factors that mark truly independent, well-reasoned
state constitutional law analysis. Ideally, such an opinion would contain the
following: (1) the text of the state and federal constitutional provisions
raised; (2) a plain statement clearly identifying the state constitutional law
provision upon which the decision was based; (3) the history of the state*
constitutional provision; (4) any history or traditions unique to the people
of the state with respect to the claim raised; (5) state precedent; and (6)
related case law from sister states.
4
While recognizing that it is the rare opinion that would satisfy all of the
above requirements, it seems clear that the more they are met, the greater
the chance that the opinion will not only resolve the dispute between the
current parties in interest, but will also serve as a guidepost for the future.
In other words, an opinion that provides an in-depth analysis of relevant
history and state precedent will serve as a building block upon which a
state's independent constitutional body of law can grow. Instead of merely
providing a cursory disposition of the dispute, the opinion will serve as an
important catalyst to state constitutional dialogue. As will be seen, there are
opinions that achieve such results. Also, it must be noted that the failure of
an opinion to include all the ideal elements does not necessarily relegate
that opinion to the annals of legal insignificance.
It was not long after ascending to Kentucky's highest court that Justice
Leibson had his first opportunity to resolve a dispute between not only two
litigants, but also two Constitutions. Decided in 1983, the same year that
Justice Leibsonjoined the Kentucky Supreme Court, Fannin v. Williams49
was a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a statute that
provided for distribution of textbooks to non-public schools. The statute
was alleged to be unconstitutional under seven separate provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the federal Constitution.
While not entirely expressing the Court's opinion in Michigan v. Long
terms - issuing a "plain statement" that any federal cases considered were
" With the exception ofthe "plain statement" factor, see Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), this list is substantially similar to the methodology
outlined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887,895 (Pa. 1991), wherein the court stated that in order to properly analyze
an issue under the state Constitution, it was preferable that the litigants each brief
and analyze the factors.
49Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983).
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for purposes of guidance only5° - Justice Leibson nonetheless strongly
indicated that the court's decision was based on the Kentucky Constitution
and that it would, therefore, be unnecessary to examine the federal
Constitution. Specifically, Justice Leibson stated, "Because we have
reached the conclusion, albeit reluctantly, that regardless of its salutary
purpose the statute violates the Kentucky Constitution, it would extend this
opinion unnecessarily to examine all of the complaints against the
constitutionality of the statute and the responses thereto."'"
Justice Leibson went on in Fannin to test the constitutionality of the
statute against each of the implicated provisions of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion. The text of each provision was set out. In some cases, the intent of the
drafters of the provision was speculated about, but more often the court
emphasized that the clear language of the provision itself led the court to
conclude that the legislature's intent was to spend public money for the
public good only.52 To buttress this conclusion, there were copious citations
to Kentucky precedent that had held various other programs invalid when
similarly challenged. There was no reference to persuasive authority from
sister states, nor was there any discussion relating to the unique traditions
of Kentucky that underlie the state Constitution.53
Justice Leibson noted that the United States Supreme Court had held
a similar distribution program constitutional under the auspices of a "child
benefit" theory in Board of Education v. Allen. 4 While pointing out that
there were factual differences between the programs, he emphasized that
there were legal distinctions that were far more important:
In Allen, the Court decided whether the statute in question violated the
seven words in the "establishment of religion" clause in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The problem in this case
is not whether the challenged statute passes muster under the federal
constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, but
whether it satisfies the much more detailed and explicit proscriptions of
the Kentucky Constitution. It does not 5
5 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
5' Fannin, 655 S.W.2d at 481. Justice Leibson's failure to follow the exact
Michigan v. Long formula in articulating the court's plain statement should not be
criticized since Fannin and Long were decided the same day.
52 See id. at 483-84.
53 See generally id.
54 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
55Fannin, 655 S.W.2d at 483.
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Justice Leibson's opinion in Fannin concluded by repeating that the
holding was reached reluctantly. The people of Kentucky wrote the
Constitution and retained the ability to amend it. "We cannot sell the
people of Kentucky a mule and call it a horse," he wrote, "even if we
believe the public needs a mule."56
The judgment in Fannin was not unanimous. Two justices dissented. 7
While they stated their belief that the challenged statute did not violate
either the state or the federal Constitution, they clearly relied upon the
United States Supreme Court holding in Allen to provide their rationale. In
essence, their dissenting opinion contains the type of quintessential
"ambiguous state ground" that the United States Supreme Court sought to
clarify inMichigan v. Longby creatingthe "plain statement" requirement.
The main thrust of the dissent was that the majority should interpret the
Kentucky Constitution in lockstep with the federal Constitution, but it did
not offer any explanation as to why this should be so. After making mixed
references to both federal and state constitutional provisions and precedent,
the dissent concluded by stating, "The majority decision in this case is a
giant step backward both in time and the law. It results in arbitrary
discrimination against individual children and their parents who choose to
select nonpublic schools for educational purposes. The entire question has
been answered by the United States Supreme Court in the Allen case more
than fifteen years ago."' 9
Overall, the majority and dissenting opinions inFannin display a fairly
rudimentary state constitutional law analysis, which is typical when
comparedto state constitutional law opinions from other jurisdictions at the
time. For example, Justice Leibson's majority opinion relied heavily upon
what he believed was the overwhelming clarity of the textual language
itself.6" The absence of a more detailed discussion regarding the intent of
the constitutional provisions at issue and any state traditions or history
unique to Kentucky makes Fannin an opinion that may be cited in later
times for the content of its holding, but not as an instructional or educa-
tional state constitutional opinion. One could not, for example, turn to
561 d. at 484.
57 The dissent was written by Justice Donald C. Wintersheimer and joined by
Justice J. Calvin Aker. Joining Justice Leibson in the majority opinion were Chief
Justice Robert F. Stephens and Justices William M. Gant, James B. Stephenson,
and Roy N. Vance. See id. at 485.
" Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
59 Fannin, 655 S.W.2d at 487 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
6o See id. at 483.
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Fannin in an effort to discover the historical underpinnings of the Kentucky
constitutional provisions it involved and what importance the court
assigned to that history. Also, one could not look to Fannin generally in an
effort to learn how to draft a state constitutional law opinion or brief.
This is equally true of the dissenting opinion, in that the conclusion that
the Kentucky Constitution was not violated was premised completely upon
federal precedent. This was so in spite of the fact that the litigants raised a
number of state constitutional challenges apart from their federal constitu-
tional challenges. This lack of differentiation makes it difficult to ascertain
whether the dissenting justices believed that the state Constitution should
be interpreted in step with the federal Constitution at all times or in this
particular area of the law only. Indeed, there was no acknowledgment at all
that judicial review under the state and federal constitutions might at times
result in divergent holdings.
In addition to Fannin, Justice Leibson wrote one other opinion in his
first year on the Kentucky Supreme Court in which both the state Constitu-
tion and the federal Constitution were raised on appeal. The case was
Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Meigs,6" which followed a determination
by the lower courts that the voir dire proceedings in a capital murder trial
were to be held outside the presence of the press. This decision was made
at the request of the accused, who stated that he feared that intense and
inaccurate pre-trial reporting would prejudice the potential jury pool, thus
denying him a fair trial as guaranteed by both the Kentucky and federal
Constitutions.62 The Lexington Herald-Leader, among other news organi-
zations, appealed the trial court's grant of closed voir dire of individual
jurors.
Writing for the majority, Justice Leibson first articulated the constitu-
tional provisions at issue and stated that the basic conflict involved "fair
trial versus free press."63 Leibson also indicated that "[t]here is no United
States Supreme Court decision nor any Kentucky case, dealing specifically
with limited closure during individual voir dire of prospective jurors."'
Thereafter, he surveyed various other courts' resolutions of issues similar
to the one at hand. In addition to Kentucky precedent, 6 he cited precedent
61 Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1983).
62 See id. at 658-6 1.
63 Id. at 662.
(4 Id. at 664.
6
1See Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Tackett, 601 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1980)
(holding that excluding every member of the press and public from criminal trial
violated presumption in favor of public trials contained in section 11 of the
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from the United States Supreme Court,66 the federal courts of appeal,67 and
the Supreme Court of California.68 Finally, Justice Leibson concluded that
"the record does not support the conclusion that [the press's] first
amendment right of access was denied in this case in a manner constitu-
tionally impermissible."
69
Kentucky Constitution); Ashland Publ'g Co. v. Asbury, 612 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that the public has no absolute right to attend pre-trial
hearings in a criminal case, and that it rests within the discretion of the trial court
to make transcripts of the proceedings public thereafter). The holding in Ashland
Publishiig is especially valuable for purposes of this essay, because it compares
sections 8 (freedom of the press), 11 (public trials), and 14 (speedy trial) of the
Kentucky Constitution with their federal counterparts, found respectively in the
First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
66 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(construing the First and Fourteenth Amendments in concluding that a state may
close the courtroom to the public during a rape trial only if closure serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (stating that unless the trial
court finds to the contrary, the trial of a criminal case is presumed to be open to the
public under the dictates of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (stating that where all parties agreed that
suppression hearing should be closed to the press and public, reporter could not
assert rights of access under the First Amendment and have trial court's order
overturned).
67 See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
press may challenge trial court's order closing voir dire and suppression hearing
where the court's reasoning for the closure is not sufficiently clear, based on First
Amendment freedom of the press and Sixth Amendment right to public trial);
United States ex rel. PulitzerPubl'g Co., 635 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating that
in camera voir dire is inappropriate if other methods of examining veniremen will
serve goals of preserving defendant's rights and granting access to press required
under First Amendment).
61 See Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980) (stating that it is
appropriate to conduct that portion of voir dire that deals with death-qualifying
jurors in a capital case individually and in sequestration from remainder of the
veniremen). The Hovey holding considered the rights of the accused under both
federal and California constitutional provisions. The relevant federal provisions
were the Sixth Amendment rights to public trial and confrontation, while the state
constitutional provisions were sections 7 (due process and equal protection), 15
(public trial), and 16 (jury trial).
69 Meigs, 660 S.W.2d at 667 (stating that both section I 1 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which requires a public trial, and the Sixth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, which contains the same requirement, support the conclusion that
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Throughout the opinion, there was no independent analysis of the
Kentucky Constitution with respect to either the right of the criminally
accused to have a fair trial or the right of the press to have access to
criminal proceedings. It is unclear from the opinion whether this omission
was the result of the parties' failure to fully brief the issues or the court's
failure to analyze the issues.
In comparing these two early opinions, Fannin and Meigs, one might
conclude simply that they are examples of the type of haphazard state
constitutional law decision-making that Professor Gardner discussed in
detailing the "general trends" of state constitutional decisions, which, he
says, are infrequent, grudgingly resorted to, and obscure.7' It is, however,
misleading to end the comparison by simply applying these broad, generic
labels. A closer examination of the issues involved in the two cases reveals
a more specific rationale as to why only the Fannin opinion contained an
independent analysis of the state Constitution.
One of the most frequent justifications put forth by proponents of state
constitutional law is that the states' constitutions are not mirror images of
the federal Constitution.71 Therefore, there are notable textual and
interpretative differences. In addition, there are differences of coverage that
can play a very important role in determining when a state constitution
should be considered apart from the federal Constitution. One such area is
education. "[I]n contrast with the Federal Constitution, state constitutions
contain numerous policy provisions - for example, guarantees of a
'thorough and efficient education,' requirements of environmental quality,
and the like." 72
Indeed, the dearth of language about education in the federal Constitu-
tion was noted by Justice Leibson early on, in the Fannin opinion. "The
federal constitution is silent on the subject of education, leaving this most
important function to the several states."'7 It is, therefore, quite plausible
that the distinction in subject matter between Fannin and Meigs, not an
inattentive or inarticulate court, partially explains the disparate analyses.
Also, it is critical to remember that both Fannin and Meigs were
written in 1983, which was not only fairly early in the New Judicial
conditional closure of voir dire is acceptable in proper circumstances).
70See Gardner, supra note 27, at 780-88.
7' See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1097, 1107 (1997) (citing to various state constitutions); see also id.
at 1112-17, 1118 n.38.
r Id.
7See Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480,482 (Ky. 1983).
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Federalism movement but also was Justice Leibson's first year on the
Kentucky Supreme Court. As previously stated, the discourse that is so
integral to the success of this movement can only be developed gradually.
At that time, only a few state courts, concentrated in the western and
northeastern sections of the country, were beginning to experiment with
state constitutional adjudication.74 Certainly, a small, midwestern,
traditionally conservative state like Kentucky would not have been
considered to be on the leading edge of what was widely believed to be a
liberal movement. Also, while a few law review articles either encouraged
or discouraged the further development of the New Judicial Federalism
movement,"5 journals and reviews focusing exclusively upon state
constitutional law had not yet come into existence. Most of the writings
available took the form of debating pros and cons. It was not until later that
state constitutional law surveys were published with regularity andjoumals
and columns arose that specifically focused upon the movement. Clearly,
the absence of a highly developed and articulate state constitutional law
discourse on the Kentucky Supreme Court in 1983 was not unusual at all,
but was rather to be expected.
This hypothesis - that Justice Leibson's early state constitutional law
opinions would naturally gravitate toward areas of particular state concern
- is buttressed by the fact that the next opinion he wrote undertook an
independent analysis of the state Constitution in a case where only the state
Constitution was at issue. Howard v. Salyer,76 decided in 19 85, involved an
issue that was peculiar to state constitutional coverage, and therefore an
independent analysis was mandated.
Howard involved the constitutionality of a so-called "local option"
election pursuant to section 61 of the Kentucky Constitution. Factually, the
case centered upon the constitutional propriety of a district election to
determine whether or not alcoholic beverages could be sold in the district.
The court had to determine whether the Cammack Act of 1906," which
favored "dry" voting over "wet" voting, had been reenacted by subsequent
legislation afterhaving been repealed in 1948. Justice Stephensonwrote the
majority opinion, holding that subsequent legislation had implicitly
74 Seesupra note 47 (showing the geographic distribution of state constitutional
law opinions).
75 See, e.g., supra notes 17, 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing the char-
acteristics of state constitutional law decisions).
7
' Howard v. Salyer, 695 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1985).
77 1906 Ky. Acts ch. 21, codified as amended at KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
[hereinafter K.R.S.] § 242.2 10 (Michie 1994).
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reenacted the Cammack Act and relying on Board of Trustees v. Scott,7
which had held the Act constitutional. 79 The result of this holding was the
determination that the district election was improperly called and was,
therefore, invalid.80
In writing an opinion for the dissent, Justice Leibson first noted that the
language of section 61 was clear, neutral, and did not favor either "wet" or
"dry" voting. In reaching this conclusion, he considered both the text of the
provision and reports of the constitutional debates.81 In Justice Leibson's
view, both the Cammack Act and Scott were the product of Prohibition-era
thinking and were clearly violative ofthe spirit and purpose ofthe Kentucky
Constitution because they favored "dry" voting over "wet" voting. "This is
a bias that contrasts with the plain meaning of the words of the constitutional
provision," he wrote, "and which represents his [referring to Chief Justice
O'Rear, who wrote the majority opinion in Scott] own viewpoint and,
historically, the passion of his time more then the time of the Constitutional
Convention of 1890."82 Because of his belief that the state precedent was
flawed because it restedupon faulty reasoning and a result-oriented rationale,
Justice Leibson concluded that "[w]e should not perpetuate erroneous
supplementation of the constitution in previous judicial decisions." 83
Accordingly, the dissenting justices were of the opinion that the election that
would have allowed alcoholic beverages to be sold in the district should have
been upheld.
Taken together, Fannin, Meigs, and Howard show that Justice Leibson
initially employed the Kentucky Constitution most often when there was no
specific federal constitutional analogy. The Kentucky court was not yet at the
stage of its state constitutional law development in which it would undertake
an independent state constitutional analysis in spite of a federal provision that
was similar or identical to the state provision. This hesitancy was not peculiar
to the Kentucky court, or to Justice Leibson in particular. Rather, it was
common to the early New Judicial Federalism movement itself.84 Again, the
" Board of Trustees v. Scott, 101 S.W. 944 (Ky. 1907) (holding that a city may
choose to be wet even if the surrounding county is dry).
79See id. at 951.
8oSee Howard, 695 S.W.2d at 422-25.
81 See id. at 426 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
82Id. (Leibson, J., dissenting).
83Id. at 427 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
84 See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models ofPost-Incorporation
Judicial Review: 1985 Survey ofState Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions,
55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 317 (1986) ("The lion's share of state constitutional law
in this area continues to be largely reactive .... Although the state courts may one
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growth and application of state constitutional law principles took time to
develop.
Importantly, the two opinions that do analyze the Kentucky Constitu-
tion, Fannin and Howard, do so in a thorough manner, considering the
legislative history, intent, text, and relevant persuasive and binding
precedent. This dedication to careful analysis served not only to better the
individual opinions, but also to provide a framework upon which later
opinions could build when the court delved deeper into state constitutional
jurisprudence.
IV. PHASE II OF JUSTICE LEIBSON'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW DEVELOPMENT: INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF ISSUES
COVERED BY BOTH THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS WHERE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT HAD NOT DECIDED A CASE SPECIFICALLY ON POINT
This portion of the Essay will explore the second phase of Justice
Leibson's state constitutional law development. After spending several
years familiarizing himself with state constitutional adjudication, Justice
Leibson's work evolved to the point where, for the first time, the court
began deciding cases based on the state Constitution although the federal
Constitution provided ample guidelines and precedent. In keeping with the
incremental approach of both the Kentucky court and the New Judicial
Federalism movement as a whole, however, this series of cases was
confined to instances in which the federal case law provided a plethora of
general guidelines but did not include a holding that would directly control
the outcome of the particular issue before the court.
The Kentucky court had the opportunity to delve deeper into state
constitutional jurisprudence in Tabler v. Wallace,85 decided in 1986, for
which Justice Leibson wrote the majority opinion. The issue in Tabler
involved the constitutionality of a no-action statute that prohibited law-
suits against those engaged in the design and construction fields of real
day get around to articulating coherent and more complete bodies of state
constitutional law, current jurisprudence in the criminal justice field remains
reactive and ad hoc."); Comment, Private Abridgment of Speech and State
Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 188 (1980) ("Cases in which state constitutional
guarantees of free speech have been used to redress private abridgment, although
few and not always clear, represent an important part of the trend away from
exclusive reliance on the federal Constitution to protect civil liberties.").
is Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1986).
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estate improvement after five years following completion of the real
estate project. Because other similarly situated groups in the construc-
tion industry, such as product manufacturers and designers, were not
brought within the purview of the statute, a challenge was brought
alleging equal protection violations under both the state and federal
Constitutions.
Unlike the education and local option cases that Justice Leibson had
previously analyzed under the Kentucky Constitution, Tabler involved an
issue to which the United States Supreme Court had dedicated ample time,
resulting in a wealth of case law. Therefore, the fact that the Kentucky
Constitution was analyzed independently represented a new stage in the
development of state constitutional jurisprudence on the Kentucky
Supreme Court.
This new willingness to employ the Kentucky Constitution even though
the federal Constitution provided a specific counterpart may be traced to
several factors. First, as stated earlier, the state constitutional law move-
ment throughout the country had been steadily gaining in prestige and
popularity since the early 1980s.86 In fact, several commentators speculated
that Justice Brennan's seminal article in the Harvard Law Review - State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights"7 - provided a
legitimacy to the movement that, in turn, encouraged greater experimenta-
tion by state courts.8 8 For whatever reason, the number of independent state
constitutional law decisions had been steadily increasing, as had the
volume of commentary on the topic.
Also, by 1986 Justice Leibson had earned his LL.M. degree from the
University of Virginia. This achievement marked the culmination of years
16 See supra notes 40-41; see also Ken Gormley, State Constitutions and
Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the 21st Century, 67 OR. L. REv. 689, 734
(1988):
With gradual precision over the process, state constitutional law is inching
away from its initial status as a harsh reaction to Supreme Court decisions
which a small group of active "liberals" found to be unpalatable, to a tool
available to liberals, conservatives, and moderates alike, who may simply
seek to build more workable, sturdy rules of law.7 See Brennan, supra note 9.
88 See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the
Third Century ofAmerican Federalism, 13 VT. L. REv. 49,49 n.2 (1988) (detailing
the proliferation of scholarly works on state constitutional law topics).
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of intensive research and writing, which broadened Leibson's intellectual
horizons. It is not difficult to conclude that Justice Leibson had a greater
familiarity with and closeness to the world of academia and legal theory
than many of his judicial counterparts nationally, and that this familiarity
was evidenced in his work product of the time.
Early in the Tabler opinion, Justice Leibson distinguished between the
text and relative specificity of the two Constitutions as they related to equal
protection. Justice Leibson concluded that "[s]ections 1,89 290 and 391 of the
Kentucky Constitution," taken together, "suffice to embrace the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 92 These provisions
required the General Assembly to treat all people equally and not exercise
arbitrary power.93 There was, however, an additional provision of the
89 This section provides:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Second: The right of worshipping Almighty God according to the
dictates of their consciences.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
Fourth: The right of freely communicating their thoughts and opinions.
Fifth: The right of acquiring and protecting property.
Sixth: The right of assembling together in a peaceable manner for their
common good, and of applying to those invested with the power of
government for redress of grievances or other proper purpose, by petition,
address or remonstrance.
Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the
State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent
persons from carrying concealed weapons.
KY. CONST. § 1.
9' This section provides: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty
and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority." Id. § 2.
9' This section provides:
All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of
exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any
man or set of men, except in consideration of public services; but no
property shall be exempt from taxation except as provided in this
Constitution; and every grant of a franchise, privilege or exemption, shall
remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment.
Id. § 3.
92 Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky. 1986).
93 See KY. CONST. §§ 1-3.
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Kentucky Constitution that controlled the analysis. Section 59 prohibited
the General Assembly from passing local or special acts regulating "the
limitation of civil or criminal causes." 94 The intent behind section 59 - to
limit the arbitrary exercise of legislative power in several very specific
instances -was manifested in the debates of the Constitutional Convention
of 1890. 91 Indeed, Justice Leibson quoted excerpts from the remarks of four
Convention delegates and noted that "limitations of time and space"
prohibited more extensive citations.96
Because the court found that the state Constitution provided a more
detailed proscription of the type of activities that were the subject matter
of the case, a federal constitutional analysis was not undertaken. This
was conspicuously noted by the Kentucky court in a "plain statement" 97:
"We have decided that KRS 413.135 violates Section 59(5) of the
Kentucky Constitution, which is much more detailed and specific than
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. We declare the
statute unconstitutional on state grounds, and do not reach the federal
question.""8
Before beginning his analysis, Justice Leibson noted that the parties'
briefs had cited to cases from thirty-one other jurisdictions that had decided
similar or identical issues involving no-action statutes. The citations were
included in a footnote,9 and the modem trend toward holding the statutes
unconstitutional under state constitutions was noted in the main text of the
opinion." ° In addition to being an important step in state constitutional
adjudication, this was noteworthy because it highlighted the benefits of
thorough briefing of state constitutional claims. As suggested by Justice
Linde, it was incumbent upon the parties to provide helpful guidance and
persuasive authorities to the state court endeavoring to resolve a dispute
under the state constitution.10'
94Id. § 59; see Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 183.
See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 183.96Id. at 183-84. One excerpt from Delegate Mackoy stated: "'[N]ow, if there
is any one evil more than another which the people of this State have earnestly
demanded should be corrected by this Convention, it was that local and special
legislation should be uprooted entirely.. . ."' Id. at 183 (quoting 3 DEBATES,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1890, at 4019).
97Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
T abler, 704 S.W.2d at 183.
99See id. at 182 n.4.
101 See id. at 182.
.0. See Linde, Without "Due Process, " supra note 23, at 182.
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Additionally, Justice Leibson cited other Kentucky cases in which
section 59(5) was used to invalidate local or special legislation and statutes
of limitations.l" Justice Leibson concluded by stating that section 59(5)
was "fundamental" to Kentucky law and must be upheld in both "letter and
spirit.' °3
The no-action statute in Tabler was declared unconstitutional under the
Kentucky Constitution because it created, without sufficient justification,
the type of arbitrary classification that section 59(5) specifically
proscribed.l"3 The more interesting aspect of the holding, however, was the
methodology or legal test used to arrive at the decision. While not
specifically holding that Kentucky equal protection standards differ from
federal standards, the language and rationales used compel the conclusion
that state equal protection standards did not reflect federal counterparts.
For instance, the Kentucky court stated that "the fundamental question
is whether the General Assembly had a reasonable basis for the legisla-
tion."'0 5 This question, under federal jurisprudence, would indicate that the
court was employing rational basis review. The state would thereafter be
required to show a legitimate government interest that it sought to further
or protect.106 Moreover, this flexible and deferential federal standard would
allow the state to provide a plausible, constitutionally sound justification
for the challenged legislation even if it was not clear that the justification
actually was the impetus for the legislation." 7 In Tabler, however, the
102 See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 184 (citing City of Louisville v. Klusmeyer, 324
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1959); Commonwealth v. McCoun, 313 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1958);
City of Louisville v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 238 S.W.2d 121 (Ky.
1951); Gorley v. City of Louisville, 47 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1898)).
103 Id.
"' See id.
"01 Id. at 185.
"o6 See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 (1979)
("[T]hese assumptions concern matters of personnel policy that do not implicate
the principle safeguarded by the Equal Protection Clause."); U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) ("[T]he challenged classification must
rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other than those
specifically stated in [the Act]."); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955) ("[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind."); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ("[Governments] must exercise
their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of the regulation.").
"' See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464 (1981)
("Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the
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Kentucky court rejected the justifications put forth by the proponents of the
statute. "A number of different reasons have been suggested by the
defendants and those filing amicus curiae briefs on their behalf for creating
a separate classification for these groups," wrote Justice Leibson, "[b]ut
these are offered only as possible reasons that could have existed, not as
reasons that did in fact exist."'
0 8
Likewise, Justice Leibson did not find a legitimate interest in providing
greater protection from legal action to those engaged in the service, as
opposed to the supply, end of the construction industry.'0 9 Indeed, the
majority opinion did not even indicate that a legitimate reason would pass
constitutional muster. Rather, Justice Leibson wrote that the appellants
failed to present a "substantial reason" justifying the classification."10 In
federal parlance, a substantial reason or interest would not indicate rational
basis review, but a higher degree of scrutiny.
In retrospect, Tabler proved to be a decision that was a turning point
in Justice Leibson's state constitutional law growth. Not only was it the
first decision that directly involved a federal constitutional provision that
had been given copious scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court, but
it also was a decision that, in its attention to detail, provided a building
block in state constitutional discourse. Each of the six factors"' previously
articulated as being indicative of a healthy growth in state constitutional
jurisprudence was included in Tabler. Also, it will be shown that the
decision was not a one-time anomaly, but a precursor of future opinions.
Gillis v. Yount,' 2 decided in 1988, built on Tabler in the independent
analysis of constitutional issues under the Kentucky Constitution. Gillis
illustrates well the point that a thorough, well-researched, and well-
reasoned opinion like Tabler will aid a state tremendously in establishing
its own constitutional law framework. While not involving section 59(5)'s
classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by
tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken."); U.S. Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("Where, as here, there are
plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end."). But see Moreno,
413 U.S. at 533-38 (noting that where the initial impetus for legislation was to
prevent "hippies" and "hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp
program - rather than to prevent fraud as the government later claimed - the statute
could not stand).
1o Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 185.
109 See id.
10 See id. at 186.
". See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
..2Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988).
1997-981 1035
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
prohibition on special or local legislation, Gillis is analogous to Tabler
because one of the more general equal protection provisions of the state
Constitution was at issue. Specifically, section 3,' "prohibiting the arbitrary
exercise of power by the General Assembly, and section 171,1 " requiring
that all taxes be uniform, were at issue. These provisions were used to
challenge a statute classifying and taxing real property containing unmined
coal differently from other real property. " '
As in Tabler, Justice Leibson's opinion in Gillis provided a detailed
historical account of the 1891 Kentucky Constitutional Convention as it
related to the intent of the framers to limit the power of the legislature to
impose arbitrary taxes and grant arbitrary exemptions.1 6 Also, Justice
Leibson's opinion explored the effect of a 1915 amendment to section 171
and concluded that the amendment "did not generate from a perceived need
to favor certain classes of property in the process of taxation."
'" 7
Thereafter, the majority opinion took issue with the contention of the
movants that the historical data was irrelevant to the issue because the
Constitution was "outmoded."" 8 As quoted by the court, a portion of the
movant's brief stated that "' [t]he politics and issues of Kentucky in 1890
are as foreign to this generation as the intrigues of ancient Rome.""' 9 In
response, Justice Leibson posited that this contentionwas false andthat the
same worries about special interest groups andunscrupulous legislators that
abounded in 1890 held true, even more so, in the present. 2 ' Citing Fannin
"
3 See KY. CONST. § 3.
14 See id. § 171. This section provides, in pertinent part:
The General Assembly shall provide by law an annual tax, which, with
other resources, shall be sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the
Commonwealth for each fiscal year. Taxes shall be levied and collected for
public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of the same
class subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws.
"1 See Gillis, 748 S.W.2d at 357-58.
"
6 See id. at 366-70 (Leibson, J., concurring.)
"
7 See id. at 361. The 1915 amendment altered the original language of section
171, which provided that state property taxes were to be "uniform upon all classes
of property," to "uniform upon all property of the same class."
"8 Id. at 359.
"
9 Id. (quoting Revenue Cabinet's Brief).
120 See id. at 360 ("The record is not convincing that circumstances today are
so different that constitutional restrictions on the power of the General Assembly
with regard to property taxes are no longer viable.").
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v. Williams,' Justice Leibson then repeated his admonishment that the
constitutional amendment process could not and should not be circum-
vented through "legislative enactment and judicial acquiescence."'' 22
Turning to the actual classification at issue, the court reaffirmed the
Tabler equal protection test and again refused to accept imaginary and
speculative justifications for the classification absent any proof of their
actual existence."u Stating that the legislature "'may indulge in class
legislation if the classification is made to depend upon natural, real or
substantial distinctions,"" 24 the court nevertheless invalidated the
legislation because it found that the statute at issue created an arbitrary
distinction: "There is no difference between unmined coal and other
unmined materials for the purpose of taxation .... "I
Because neither the parties nor the intermediate appellate court raised
or analyzed any federal constitutional provisions, such as the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees, the Kentucky court did
not reach any federal issues and did not have to include a "plain state-
ment" insulating the decision from further appellate review. While not
citing to any persuasive authority from sister states, the opinion in Gillis
still provided a complete state constitutional review that served to add to
the complexity, intricacy, and richness of Kentucky state constitutional
law.
Although not addressing identical state and federal constitutional pro-
visions, the case of Diemer v. Commonwealth,'26 decided in 1990, is of
interest because the challenged statute, which the court held unconstitu-
tional under the state Constitution, was clearly not violative of the federal
Constitution. In fact, the statute specifically borrowed language from
analogous federal legislation. 7 The issue in Diemer was whether a pro-
vision of the Kentucky Billboard Act granting the Secretary of Transpor-
tation broad discretion to define an "urban area" resulted. in an "uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power to executive authority."'28
"2 Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983).
122 Gillis, 748 S.W.2d at 360.
123See id. at 362.
.24 Id. at 363 (quoting Board of Educ. of Jefferson County v. Board of Educ. of
Louisville, 472 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1971)).
2 Id.
126 Diemer v. Commonwealth, 786 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1990).
1
2 7 See id. at 865.
28 Id. at 863.
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Thus, the applicable state constitutional provisions pertaining to separation
of powers 29 were in the forefront of the discussion."'
Quoting from a 1922 Kentucky case, Justice Leibson noted: "Perhaps
no state forming a part of the national government of the United States has
a constitution whose language more emphatically separates and perpetuates
what might be termed the American tripod form of government than does
... [the Kentucky] Constitution .... ," With this historical background in
context, Justice Leibson then proceeded to determine whether the
discretion granted to the Secretary resulted in legislative authority being
vested in the executive. Since the term "urban area" was not defined in the
statute, the court concluded that the legislation vested the Secretary with
lawmaking power because the vague nature of the statute allowed the
Secretary to make policy rather than to simply enforce laws.
132
This holding was made despite the clear recognition by the court that
the statute in question did not violate the federal Constitution. "Our
Kentucky regulation has the virtue of not being at variance with federal
legislation, but it has little else."133 The rationale for this result was that the
Kentucky Constitution, through the plain wording of its provisions as well
as case law interpreting them, exacted a higher standard than the federal
Constitution.13 4 Justice Leibson wrote:
The fact that the broad delegation of legislative authority to determine the
definition of an "urban area" found in the federal statute is copied in the
state statute does not cure its state constitutional law defects. Even if we
are to assume that the federal law would escape federal constitutional
129 These provisions are sections 27 and 28, which provide as follows:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to
a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another.
No person, or collection of persons, being of one of those departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except
in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28.
30 See Diemer, 786 S.W.2d at 864-65.
131 Id.
12 See id. at 865.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 865-66.
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scrutiny, our Kentucky Constitution imposes a higher standard in this
area. 1
3 5
Thus, gradually the Kentucky Supreme Court began to use its state
Constitution as a protector of the rights of the people of Kentucky equal to
or greater than the federal Constitution. Diemer proved to be another
important link in the development of Kentucky's state constitutional law
because, like Fannin v. Williams 136 seven years before, a Kentucky statute
modeled after its federal counterpart was held unconstitutional under the
state Constitution. Justice Leibson's state constitutional analysis inDiemer,
however, went further than that of Fannin in that the subject matter at issue
in Diemer - separation of powers - is at the heart of the federal Constitu-
tion. In contrast, the subject matter at issue in Fannin - education - is not
specifically provided for in the federal Constitution. This incremental
progress in Justice Leibson's state constitutional law analysis and
development of Kentucky's state constitutional discourse continued in later
cases.
V. PHASE III OF JUSTICE LEIBSON'S STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: INDEPENDENT
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES COVERED BY BOTH THE
KENTUCKY AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS WHERE
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAD
DECIDED A CASE DIRECTLY ON POINT
After spending almost a decade on Kentucky's highest court, during
which he familiarized himself with the intricacies and benefits of state
constitutional adjudication, Justice Leibson was poised to examine a case
in which, despite controlling federal constitutional precedent, 131 the
Kentucky Supreme Court would interpret analogous provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution independently, and in the end reach a different
result.' More important, however, was the development of the methodol-
ogy employed by Justice Leibson: rather than drafting a state constitutional
opinion that merely disposed of the case at hand, his work in Common-
135 Id.
'36Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983).
'
3 7 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding there is no funda-
mental federal constitutional right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
131 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
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wealth v. Wasson'39 demonstrated an appreciation for state case law that
left a jurisprudential legacy to the people of Kentucky - a framework for
later opinions that would buttress Kentucky's rich social and legal
traditions. In Wasson, one can readily see how the preceding decade of
growth led to a decision that can only be described as a pinnacle of state
constitutional jurisprudence. The case, decided in 1992, exemplifies the
conclusion that state constitutional discourse can, in fact, develop if given
time to grow and mature.
The Wasson opinion could not have been written a decade earlier when
Justice Leibson began his tenure on the Kentucky Supreme Court. At that
time, Justice Leibson was too inexperienced with the New Judicial
Federalism movement, and too cautious in his application of it, to envision
using the Kentucky Constitution to grant greater rights of privacy to
Kentucky's homosexual citizens than wouldbe permitted under the federal
Constitution. As we have seen, Justice Leibson's early forays into state
constitutional law were confined to areas peculiar to state constitutional
coverage and concern. Gradually, Justice Leibson's state constitutional
focus developed to the point where - as in Tabler and Diemer - the court
analyzed issues that were covered by both the state and federal Constitu-
tions. It was not until Wasson, however, that Justice Leibson's sophistica-
tion and confidence in state constitutional adjudication developed to the
point where the Kentucky Supreme Court heldthat a specific constitutional
law decision - Bowers v. Hardwick4 ° - decided by the United States
Supreme Court did not apply in Kentucky because the federal Constitution,
unlike the Kentucky Constitution, did not recognize a broad enough
spectrum of rights. When viewed as part of a greater continuum, Justice
Leibson's opinion in Wasson was a culmination of years of incremental
progress towards the development of independent state constitutional
analysis in Kentucky.
At issue in Wasson was a state statute criminalizing "deviant sexual
intercourse"14' with a person of the same sex. The defendant had been
arrested and convicted of solicitation to commit the offense after
propositioning an undercover police officer during a sting operation.
Because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers controlled
the resolution of any privacy issues raised under the federal Constitution,
the attorneys for the defendant challenged the statute solely on state
3 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
'
40 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
141 K.R.S. § 510.100 (Michie 1990) (judicially invalidated as to private acts
between consenting adults).
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constitutional grounds. Justice Leibson included a plain statement quite
early in the opinion to the effect that any discussion of federal precedent,
particularly Bowers, was relevant only to the state law issue.
14 1
Initially, the court addressed whether the statute violated the implicit
right to privacy recognized in the Kentucky Constitution, a right not
recognized, according to Bowers, by the federal Constitution. 143 It was this
very issue, but in the federal context, that the United States Supreme Court
had decided in Bowers.'" Because Wasson ultimately rejected Bowers, it
was necessary to fully explore the state constitutional question and provide
a rationale as to why the court found it necessary to deviate from the
Bowers holding.
Justice Leibson first noted that there were "both textual and structural
differences between the United States Bill of Rights and our own. . . ."145
The court then emphasized the fact that many state constitutions, including
Kentucky's, pre-dated the federal Constitution. State constitutions were the
source of the federal Constitution, rather than the reverse.146 Highlighting
the textual differences between the two documents was the fact that, in the
federal Constitution, the only reference to individual liberties is included
in the Preamble. In contrast, while the Kentucky Constitution has similar
language in its Preamble, there are additional, more specific, provisions
that are applicable. In particular, Justice Leibson noted that sections 1 and
2 of the state Bill of Rights serve to "amplify" the Preamble.44 As such, it
was only natural to assume that a history unique to Kentucky shaped the
state Constitution and should be consulted in its interpretation.
Justice Leibson seized upon this notion and stated that it was particu-
larly significant that Kentucky had been a leader, early on, in protecting
individual rights: "Kentucky has a rich and compelling tradition of
recognizing and protecting individual rights from state intrusion in cases
similar in nature, found in the Debates of the Kentucky Constitutional
Convention of 1890 and cases from the same era when that Constitution
was adopted."14 Justice Leibson found this early state case lawparticularly
compelling because the judges of that era wrote their opinions "with a
142 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 489.
'43 See id. at 490.
144 See id.
141 Id. at 492.
146 See id. (noting "State constitutional law documents and the writings on
liberty were more the source of federal law than the child of federal law").
147 See id.
148 Id.
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direct, firsthand knowledge of the mind set of the constitutional fathers,
upholding the right of privacy against the intrusive police power of the
state."' 49 Leibson then quoted portions of the Proceedings and Debates of
the 1890 Convention, from which it was evident that there existed a strong
intent to protect the privacy of individuals.150 For instance, one delegate
stated that the exercise of the rights vested in the people should be
protected by the Constitution" 'provided that he shall in no wise injure his
neighbor in so doing." 5' With this in mind, Justice Leibson then
concluded that, although the right of privacy in the Kentucky Constitution
was not stated in precise terminology, it had long been interpreted by the
courts as being "inalienable"'5 2 and "recognized as an integral part of the
guarantee of liberty in our 1891 Kentucky Constitution since its
inception."'53 In support of this statement, the majority opinion provided
numerous citations to state precedent.' 4
The cited cases made it quite clear that the right of privacy in Kentucky
protected individuals from state legislation that was designed to regulate
morals to the detriment of individual expression."5 "[Legislating penal
sanctions solely to maintain widely held concepts of morality and
aesthetics is a costly enterprise," wrote Justice Leibson. "It sacrifices
personal liberty, not because the actor's conduct results in harm to another
citizen but only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of
acceptable behavior."'5 6 Because the United States Supreme Court holding
inBowers declaredthat privacy rights under the federal Constitution extend
only to those activities that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
1
49 Id.
"5 0 See id. at 494.
'' Id. (quoting J. Proctor Knott).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 495.
154 See id. at 494-97.
... See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W. 749 (Ky. 1923) (holding a
hotel room does not constitute a public place); Commonwealth v. Smith, 173 S.W.
340 (Ky. 1915) (stating that police power is limited to actions affecting the public);
Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1913) (holding that
states may not regulate interstate commerce wholly); Hershberg v. City of
Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911) (holding that a statute regulating cigarette
smoking in one's home violated the right to privacy); Commonwealth v. Campbell,
117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909) (holding that state constitutions cannot prohibit citizens
from having liquor for their own use).
156 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
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tradition," sodomy not being among one of those traditions, 117 the Kentucky
court found the Supreme Court's rationale flawed and unpersuasive.'58
The most significant analytical flaw that Justice Leibson focused upon
was what he termed Bowers' "misdirected application of the theory of
original intent."'59 Specifically, Justice Leibson believed that the narrow
framing of the issue in Bowers led to a result that was at odds with a
contemporary interpretation of liberty interests. To illustrate his point,
Justice Leibson noted that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
almost surely did not intend that interracial marriages be sanctioned.
Nevertheless, the amendment was interpreted in an "enlightened" manner
by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia,16° which held that state
prohibitions of interracial marriages were not constitutionally
permissible.'
61
Thereafter, Justice Leibson's opinion cited various state court decisions
that had also reached holdings at variance with Bowers when interpreting
their own constitutions.62 Particularly persuasive was the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio,163 decided in
1980, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that its state's
voluntary deviant sexual intercourse statute violated the equal protection
guarantees of both the federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions."6 The
prohibition under the Pennsylvania statute applied to both homosexual and
heterosexual conduct.161 The Kentucky court found the Bonadio holding
more persuasive than other state authorities because, when adopting its
Constitution, the Kentucky delegates copied almost verbatim from the
'5 7 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
'58 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497.
159 Id.
160 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
161 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497.
62 See id. at 498. State supreme court decisions cited are People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (holding sodomy statute invalid when based on police
power), and Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (holding that
state's voluntary deviant sexual behavior statute was violative of police power and
the right to equal protection). Lower state court cases cited include Texas v.
Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that statute prohibiting
private sexual relations between same-sex adults was violative of Texas's state
constitutional right to privacy).
163 Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
'"See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
165 See id.
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then-recently enacted Pennsylvania Constitution. 66 This shaied heritage
made the reasoning behind Bonadio uniquely compelling, which, in turn,
led to Justice Leibson's conclusion that "our decision, rather then being the
leading edge of change, is but a part of the moving stream."1 67
, Although the Kentucky Supreme Court thus held that the challenged
statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the state constitutional guarantee
of privacy, Justice Leibson nevertheless proceeded to reach the second
issue presented by the appellants; namely, whether the statute violated the
state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. At this point, Justice
Leibson embarked on a pure state constitutional analysis, with no need to
distinguish his holding from Bowers. The statute in Bowers did not
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection provisions because
it criminalized both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, while the
Kentucky statute specifically criminalized only homosexual conduct.
1 6
With this issue, Justice Leibson once again had the opportunity to
reaffirm his earlier decision in Tabler v. Wallace'69 and to apply Ken-
tucky's unique Tabler equal protection test. First, however, he addressed
the threshold question of whether one's sexual preference is a characteristic
that is immutable, thus creating a protected class for purposes of scrutiny.1
7 0
Justice Leibson answered this inquiry in the affirmative and stated that he
was particularly impressed with the "medical, scientific and social science
data provided in the briefs filed herein by Amicus Curiae."'' (Again, as in
Tabler, this overt recognition by Justice Leibson of the importance of
thorough briefing cannot be de-emphasized.)
But Justice Leibson's majority opinion departed from utilizing federal
constitutional categories and standards. For example, Justice Leibson did
not state that homosexual people in Kentucky were a suspect class.' 72 In
federal jurisprudence, this classification would be highly significant and
would allow a court to employ a strict scrutiny method of review. In order
166 See id. ("A comparison of the Kentucky Bill of Rights of 1792 and a number
of earlier, now defunct constitutions of the leading colonies, demonstrates
unequivocally that the original Kentucky Bill of Rights was borrowed almost
verbatim from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790." Ken Gormley & Rhonda
G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill ofRights: A Bicentennial Celebration, 80 KY. L.J.
1 (1991-92)).
167 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
168 See id.
169 Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1986).
170 See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500.
171 Id.
172 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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to find that the challenged law was constitutional, the state would have had
to prove that it had a compelling interest and that the statute was narrowly
tailored to meet that compelling interest. 17 3 Rather, the court categorized
homosexuals as a protected class and fi-amed the issue as whether the state
can prove "a substantial governmental interest, a rational basis, for
different treatment."'74 Thereafter, the court used the test developed in
Tabler to determine the validity of the state's interest. Concluding that the
state's proposed justifications for the legislation were either "outrageous"
or "arbitrary," the court held that the statute violated sections 2 and 3 of the
Kentucky Constitution.11
One curious aspect of the equal protection test used in Wasson, and
borrowed from Tabler, was that in Tabler there was no protected class
involved. This was equally true of the classification that was at issue in
Gillis. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that occupation in a
particular field of the construction industry, or owning land containing
unmined coal, was an immutable characteristic. Nonetheless, Justice
Leibson carefully reviewed whether homosexuals were a protected class
before progressing with his analysis.176 The end result seems to be that the
Tabler equal protection test applies to all classifications.
While this speculation may be unsatisfying to those who desire the
relative clarity that the federal classifications and levels of scrutiny
provide, one must remember that the federal case law in this area devel-
oped over a number of years and underwent numerous revisions. Also,
while the federal standards and classifications seem to be fairly well-
established at present, there is no guarantee that they will not undergo still
more revision in the future. Constitutional law, both state and federal, is an
ever-growing and, therefore, ever-changing body of jurisprudence. This
fact springs from the necessity of adapting our jurisprudential models to
modem life, and the federal Constitution is no more exempt from these
changes in interpretation than state constitutions.
Also, if the speculation that Kentucky's Tabler equal protection test
applies to all classifications is correct, the people of Kentucky would enjoy
'
73 See id. at 8-10. The U.S. Supreme Court noted it did "not accept the State's
contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for
concluding that they serve a rational purpose... where the Equal Protection Clause
requires the consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute
constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination." Id. at 6.
174 Wasson, 482 S.W.2d at 500-01.
175 Id.
176See id. at 499-501.
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a test that not only offers a higher degree of protection to claimants across
the board than the federal standards, but also would be easier to apply.
There would be no need to inquire whether or not a given claimant was a
member of a protected or suspect class, because all claimants would be
entitled to a review using the equivalent of the most stringent federal tier
of review, strict scrutiny. Unfortunately, Justice Leibson's death made the
fate of the Tabler equal protection test uncertain. It remains to be seen
whether the present Kentucky court will apply the Tabler test to all
classifications.
There were two dissenting opinions in Wasson, the first of which was
written by Justice Lambert. With respect to the privacy issue, Justice
Lambert forcefully voiced his opinion that the Kentucky court should have
followed the United States Supreme Court precedent, Bowers.' After
quoting at length from the portion of Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion in Bowers that related to the historical societal and penal proscrip-
tions against sodomy, Justice Lambert stated: "The history and traditions
of this Commonwealth are fully in accord with the Biblical, historical and
common law view. Since at least 1860, sodomy has been a criminal offense
in Kentucky and this fact was well known to the delegates of the 1890
Constitutional Convention."'78 This rationale inescapably leads one to
conclude that Justice Lambert framed the issue narrowly, just as the
Bowers majority had done - as whether there existed a constitutional right
of privacy to engage in sodomy, rather than whether there existed a
constitutional right to be free from governmental regulation and intrusion
in planning one's private affairs. By so doing, Justice Lambert proceeded
to develop an argument based on the same type of faulty original intent
reasoning that Justice Leibson had conspicuously critiqued in his majority
opinion.'79 Once the issue was so narrowly framed, it naturally followed
that Justice Lambert would conclude that the framers of the Kentucky
Constitution did not evidence any intent to protect the right of people to
engage in sodomy.
Interestingly, Justice Lambert did include in his opinion a statement of
his belief that the Kentucky Supreme Court should not blindly follow the
precedent of the United States Supreme Court at every turn. It was Justice
Lambert's belief that "on those occasions when state courts depart from
that Court's reasoned interpretations, it should be for compelling reasons,
usually text or tradition, and only in clearly distinguishable circumstances,
'7 See id. at 504 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
78Id. at 503-04 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
171 See id. at 497.
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none of which are present here."' 80 Justice Lambert did not, however, cite
any state precedent or describe any hypothetical circumstances that would
illustrate when a departure from a United States Supreme Court holding
was justified. Also, as Justice Leibson's majority opinion so carefully and
fully developed the textual and traditional differences between the state and
federal Constitutions, it is difficult to understand why Justice Lambert did
not believe that Wasson presented a situation in which departure from
federal precedent was proper.
With respect to the equal protection claim, Justice Lambert stated that
the statute at issue was properly analyzed using traditional rational basis
review.'8 ' After citing a number of landmark United States Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Lambert rightly concluded that sexual orientation was not
an immutable characteristic triggering heightened scrutiny under the
federal Constitution. 2 He did not discuss whether sexual orientation
should properly give rise to a protected class or a suspect classification
under the Kentucky Constitution. This would have been the better analysis,
because at no point in Justice Leibson's majority opinion did he claim that
homosexuals were entitled to heightened scrutiny under the federal
Constitution. To the contrary, Justice Leibson specifically noted that sexual
orientation was not an immutable characteristic for purposes of federal
review.8 3 Instead, Justice Leibson held that the Kentucky Constitution
provided the means for triggering the protected classification.
84
Justice Wintersheimer wrote the second dissent in Wasson. The initial
portion of the opinion indicates that the majority opinion was improperly
rendered and advisory in nature.'85 This conclusion was reached by noting
that Jeffrey Wasson was charged with solicitation to commit sodomy
during an undercover police operation, not with commission of the actual
offense. Because the solicitation occurred on a public street, Justice
Wintersheimer found that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
under the circumstances and that the constitutionality of the statute was not
properly before the court. 86 Thereafter, Justice Wintersheimer stated:
Judicial time is very precious and there is no reason why this Court should
be seeking problems to solve which we make on our own initiative.
180 Id. at 504 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
181 See id. at 507 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
'
82 See id. at 507-08 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 499.
184 See id. at 500.
"'85 See id. at 510 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
186 See id. at 508-09 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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Apparently the majority opinion could not wait for a proper case but it
had to jump into the controversy in order to proclaim its view on the
discovery of privacy in Kentucky.
187
Strangely, following this admonishment, Justice Wintersheimer went onto
give his own advisory opinion on whether engaging in homosexual sodomy
was a protected privacy right under the Kentucky Constitution. He further
discussed whether homosexuals are a protected class for purposes of equal
protection analysis.
As to the privacy issue, Justice Wintersheimer's dissenting opinion
stated that the majority of the public had the right to legislate against
traditionally morally offensive behaviors engaged in by a minority of the
public.'88 With this pronouncement, he was in lock-step with the majority
in Bowers. Unlike Justice Lambert, Justice Wintersheimer did not say
whether he believed that a state constitutional opinion holding to the
contrary of a United States Supreme Court decision was proper under any
circumstances. Thereafter, the portion of the dissent discussing the privacy
issue blurred the line between the privacy and the equal protection
challenges because it outlined the state's interest in the health and safety
of the public at large and concluded that such considerations prevailed
"over any equal protection challenge."' 89
Addressing the equal protection issue, Justice Wintersheimer, like
Justice Lambert, found that one's sexual orientation is not an immutable
characteristic. 9 ' Thereafter, Justice Wintersheimer rather summarily
concluded that it was rational for the legislature to distinguish between
187 Id. at 510 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
188 See id. at 511-14 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
'
8 9 Id. at 511 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
'
90 See id. at 516 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). Justice Wintersheimer stated
that the majority failed to correctly analyze the equal protection issue. Thereafter,
Justice Wintersheimer concluded that homosexual people do not make up a suspect
class because "[s]hared attitudes or preferences of any kind do not establish a
recognizable class because they are subject to change." Id. (Wintersheimer, J.,
dissenting). However, it must be noted that Justice Wintersheimer's analysis of the
issue, purporting to use the federal classifications, was itself flawed and/or
confusing in that both federal rational basis and strict scrutiny language was
employed. Stated Justice Wintersheimer: "[A] careful examination of the record in
this case indicates there is a reasonable basis for K.R.S. 510.100 because
Kentucky's interest in eradicating such behavior is compelling." Id.
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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homosexual and heterosexual sexual behavior because the health risks
posed by AIDS were more prevalent in the homosexual population.' 91
In making the determination that sexual orientation was not an
immutable characteristic, Justice Wintersheimer deviated from Justice
Leibson's mode of thinking by characterizing homosexuality as a personal
preference that is subject to change. 92 Conversely, Justice Leibson's
majority opinion focused upon sexual orientation being a final and
immutable characteristic akin to gender and race.'93 As previously stated,
Justice Leibson's determination was premised in large part upon the
persuasive medical and scientific data provided by the briefs of appellee
and amicus curiae.94 At several points in his opinion, Justice
Wintersheimer cited "defense experts" to support his conclusion that
homosexuals are more sexually promiscuous and more likely to transmit
infectious diseases. 95 While clearly advocating a different position than
Justice Leibson on the issue, Justice Wintersheimer's reliance upon-data
contained in the parties' briefs is important from a state constitutional law
standpoint.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the ultimate holding in Wasson,
it cannot be said that the opinion is merely a reactionary response to a
United States Supreme Court opinion with which one finds fault. It would
be difficult indeed to put forth an argument that Wasson did not provide the
citizens and courts of Kentucky with a rich piece of state constitutional
material that will prove valuable to litigants and courts. The depth of
research and reasoning throughout the opinion belies such a conclusion.
One need only compare the Wasson opinion with Justice Leibson's
earlier work to see how vastly different the state constitutional law analyses
are, and how Wasson was a natural outgrowth of Justice Leibson's gradual
yet expanding experimentation with state constitutional law. For example,
when, almost a decade earlier, Justice Leibson wrote the majority opinion
in Fannin v. Williams,9 6 he discussed the intent of the drafters of the
provision at issue rather cursorily, relying on the clarity of the text itself.
Also, while he cited Kentucky precedent, Justice Leibson did not discuss
Kentucky's unique historical background and traditions. The end result was
that while the narrow issue before the court was disposed of, Fannin failed
'9' See id. at 517 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
192See id. at 516 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
193 See id. at 499.
194 See id. at 500.
'95 Id. at 511, 516, 517 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
196Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1983).
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to provide a broad workable outline for litigants to follow in framing state
constitutional challenges and briefs.
Conversely, Wasson provided exactly the type of analysis and guidance
integral to the development of a rich and complex state constitutional
jurisprudence. The opinion was well-reasoned and thoughtfully analyzed.
The substantial historical survey of both the Kentucky Constitution and
relevant binding and persuasive case law provided an ample basis for the
ultimate conclusion that federal decisional law was not applicable and that
its adoption would run contrary to both the spirit and intent of the state
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Justice Leibson's early retirement from the Kentucky Supreme Court
makes any forecasts about the future of state constitutional law adjudica-
tion on the Kentucky Supreme Court speculative. Only time will tell
whether the current court members have the drive to continue the justice's
work. 197
What is not speculative is the legacy that Justice Leibson gave to the
people of Kentucky. Through thoughtful analyses and an unrelenting
dedication to continual education, Justice Leibson was able to offer the
people of Kentucky an individualized jurisprudence that closely reflected
the intent of the framers of their Constitution. At the same time, the
people's right to privacy, to equal protection under the law, and to
accountability and responsibility in government was expanded beyond the
minimum federal requirements.
197 In the years since Justice Leibson's death (which followed soon after his
retirement), there has been one case decided by the Kentucky court that employed
the Tabler equal protection test. In St. Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Health Policy Bd., 913
S.W.2d 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996), the court was called upon to decide whether section
59 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibiting local or special legislation had been
violated. The statute at issue granted exceptions from the state's certificate-of-need
requirement for existing hospitals that wished to establish neonatal care facilities.
Writing for the majority, Justice Schroder reaffirmed Tabler's central holding, that
speculative or imaginative justifications for treating entities differently would not
pass constitutional muster. The court required the appellant to demonstrate that the
classification was based on a "substantial and justifiable reason" even though, as
in Tabler and Wasson, there was no "suspect" or "protected" class involved. While
the opinion itself is somewhat terse and lacking in-depth analysis of the provision
at issue, it is nonetheless a hopeful sign of the future vitality of Justice Leibson's
work.
1050 [VOL. 86
1997-98] JUSTICE CHARLES M. LEIBSON 1051
On a broader level, study of Justice Leibson's tenure on the Kentucky
Supreme Court provides support for the proposition that state constitutional
law can succeed and flourish given time and dedication. Justice Leibson
gave that time and dedication, creating a constitutionally sound body of law
independent of the United States Constitution. While some, like Professor
Gardner, may doubt that states can develop a coherent state constitutional
discourse, the career of Justice Charles M. Leibson demonstrates that such
discourse is both possible and desirable; it only needs sufficient time to
prove itself.

